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Restructure and Reform:
Products-Liability Law in North Carolina
DR. J. STANLEY MCQUADE*
OLIVIA L. WEEKS**
INTRODUCTION
Modern products-liability law has developed in a relatively short
period of time, but it has not been a systematic, continuous process.
Instead, the law has developed erratically, in a series of sudden leaps.
Some of the steps made in the name of progress proved to be problematic,
and various solutions developed to address issues as they arose. Initially,
these progressive movements caused considerable confusion, but this
confusion has been resolved with time. As a result, a reasonable, workable
consensus has developed.1
In 1979 and 1997, respectively, two important developments emerged:
the Model Uniform Product Liability Act (MUPLA)2 and the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability.3 These publications present a common
yet impressive picture of products-liability law.4 Over the last several
* Lynch Professor of the Philosophy of Law, Campbell University School of Law.
** Director of the Law Library and Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell University
School of Law.
1. See J. Stanley McQuade, Products Liability – Emerging Consensus and Persisting
Problems: An Analytical Review Presenting Some Options, 25 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 9–10
(2002).
2. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (Oct. 31, 1979). The
Act was published by the Department of Commerce and was intended for enactment by the
states. Id.; see also VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40148, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
A LEGAL OVERVIEW 12 (2014). Both the draft and final versions were introduced in the
96th Congress but neither was enacted. See id.
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (approved
unanimously by the diverse membership of the American Law Institute on May 20, 1997).
4. Much of the success of these publications stemmed from the academics who wrote
them. Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron Twerski, two formidable scholars,
were the case reporters for the Restatement, supported by a small army of respected judges,
law professors, and experienced plaintiff and defense practitioners. Similarly, MUPLA was
managed and steered by Professor Victor Schwartz, another acclaimed scholar, who had the
benefit of input from a variety of interested parties, including lawyers, industry executives,
and representatives from the insurance industry.
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decades, tort-reform movements have generated products-liability
legislation in various jurisdictions. These acts incorporated provisions
from various sources, but drew heavily from MUPLA. The North Carolina
Products Liability Act,5 in particular, has gone through a number of
revisions to incorporate measures introduced by the courts as well as
provisions from MUPLA.
This Article suggests that, although previous revisions to the North
Carolina Products Liability Act brought progress, more revisions are
needed, and these revisions will be best accomplished by incorporating
additional measures into the act, especially those that have gained wide
acceptance elsewhere. Part I of this Article provides a brief introduction to
the early development of products liability law. Part I.A discusses tort-law
influences in products liability, and Part I.B focuses on contributions from
contract law. Parts II.A and II.B briefly describe MUPLA and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, respectively. Part III
discusses the current state of products-liability law in North Carolina and
suggests a number of proposed improvements to North Carolina’s
products-liability act.
I.

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN PRODUCTS-LIABILITY LAW

Products-liability law developed in American jurisdictions by
adapting previously existing causes of action. Change was slow at first; the
tort of negligence was first modified by eliminating the privity
requirement6 and later by allowing circumstantial evidence of damages.7
Change has proceeded at an accelerated pace ever since.
A. Tort-Law Influences
Perhaps the most drastic change to products-liability law was the
introduction of the strict-liability doctrine. The doctrine of strict liability
was originally developed in tort law in connection with dangerous entities
on land and was later extended to “abnormally dangerous activities.”8 The
5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to -12 (2013).
6. See Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (introducing the
requirement of privity, which was widely adopted by American courts before being rejected
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916)).
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1965). In
determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, “[t]he essential question is
whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the
circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm that
results from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable care.” Id.
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doctrine of strict liability was introduced into products-liability law by
California Supreme Court Justice Roger J. Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.,9 and was incorporated shortly thereafter into the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965.10 As a result, the doctrine
experienced two changes. First, strict liability was no longer purely
connected with land and was extended to ultra-hazardous activities.11 The
second change required establishing the defense that an activity was
common or usual in the area, which was established by Fletcher v.
Rylands.12 When strict liability was applied in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts to ultra-hazardous activities, the defense that the activity was usual in
the area still applied.13 In products liability, however, all goods affected
are usual in the area; therefore, this defense had to be dropped.
The doctrine of strict liability for defective goods as defined in section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was an instant success.
Jurisdiction after jurisdiction adopted it, either judicially or by legislation.14
North Carolina remained in the minority of states that did not join this
9. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (“A
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being.”).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
11. Fletcher v. Rylands (1865) 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 740–42 (dealing with ultrahazardous activities on land). Ultra-hazardous activities were later extended to things like
wild animals, explosives, and similar items in which the possession of the item alone is
enough to trigger liability without proof of fault. See Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d
1162, 1165 (Cal. 1978).
12. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. at 741. For example, when mining was usual in the area,
there was no liability to farmers whose animals were disturbed by frequent explosions. See,
e.g., Hieber v. Cent. Ky. Traction Co., 140 S.W. 54, 56 (Ky. 1911) (horses); Held v. Red
Malcuit, Inc., 230 N.E.2d 674, 676 (Ohio C.P. 1967) (pheasants); Gronn v. Rogers Constr.,
Inc., 350 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Or. 1960) (mink); Madsen v. E. Jordan Irrigation Co., 125 P.2d
794, 795 (Utah 1942) (mink); Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645, 648–49 (Wash.
1954) (mink).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i.
14. For a representation of state decisions adopting section 402 or some form of strict
liability, see, for example, O. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248, 251–52 (Ariz. 1968)
(applying section 402A to a defective boat-steering mechanism); Hiigel v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 987–88 (Colo. 1975) (recognizing strict liability for casting a defective
product into the stream of commerce); Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189, 192 (Conn.
1965); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976); Stewart v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240, 243 (Haw. 1970) (imposing strict liability on one who
sells or leases a defective product that is dangerous to the user or consumer as long as the
seller is in that business and the product reaches the ultimate consumer without substantial
change); Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 518 P.2d 857, 859–60 (Idaho 1974); Hawkeye-Sec.
Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672, 684 (Iowa 1970).
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trend.15 This turned out to be a fortunate decision, for it soon became
apparent that serious problems arose from strict liability as it was defined
in section 402A. If strict liability had been properly defined,16 there may
have been less difficulty.
Finally, there was a significant problem with strict liability in relation
to design and warning defects. The distinction between design defects and
warning defects in strict liability and negligence is clearly
indistinguishable. The standard of conduct required of the defendant is the
same for both: a duty to use reasonable care.17 The relevant defect is
failure to design or warn in a reasonable manner when a better warning or
design was available and should have been used.18 Most jurisdictions have
recognized this problem and avoided it by redefining strict liability in
design or warning cases as failure to use a better design or warning. This
issue was addressed in MUPLA and in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability by defining the various types of defects individually.
As solutions developed to questions surrounding early productsliability law, another problem arose with relation to user fault. Because the
defendant manufacturer could not avoid liability by showing due care in
strict-liability jurisdictions, it was argued—although not very sensibly—
that user fault on the part of the plaintiff likewise could not be pleaded.19
States that recognized contributory negligence were not required to
consider this issue,20 but it did require attention in the majority of states.
B. Contract-Law Influences
While much of products-liability law developed from tort law, other
developments grew out of contract law. One such development was
warranty law. As a result, the source of modern products-liability law on

15. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 5.3, at 282–83 & n.106 (2005)
(noting that as of 2005, the only states that firmly reject the doctrine of strict products
liability in tort are Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia).
16. For example, expressly stating that there is no need to prove fault and that due care
is not a defense.
17. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 5.9, at 331.
18. Id. at 330–31.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Comment
n mentions only two kinds of plaintiff misbehavior: (1) ordinary fault, where the plaintiff
did not see the danger, and (2) assumption of the risk, where the plaintiff was actually aware
of the danger but nevertheless unreasonably proceeded to chance it. There is nothing
mentioned between these two extremes; however assumption of risk by the plaintiff is a
defense.
20. The issue of user fault on the part of the plaintiff may also affect the law in North
Carolina if contributory negligence is abolished.
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warranties is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).21 The implied
warranty of merchantability set out in Article 2 of the UCC reinforced
earlier changes in products liability by dropping the privity requirement
between the parties.22 The UCC also replaced the statute of limitations
with a statute that was more comparable to the limitations period applied in
tort cases.23
Early improvements to the state of products-liability law were
noticeable, though not always effective. For starters, the critical notion of
defect was defined in UCC terms24 as disappointing the expectations of the
reasonable consumer, also known as the “consumer expectations test.”25
This test proved somewhat vague and was less than helpful to juries faced
with these issues in court. The consumer expectations test was, however,
favored by plaintiffs’ attorneys because the test made it easier to get to the
jury with a sympathetic plaintiff.26
These developments in early products-liability law influenced
jurisdictions and decisions that have laid the groundwork for modern
products-liability law in the twenty-first century.
II. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN PRODUCTS-LIABILITY LAW
A. MUPLA
Federal involvement in the products-liability field can be traced to the
Interagency Task Force on Product Liability created by the Ford
Administration in 1976.27 The working task force was chaired by Professor
Victor Schwartz, an acknowledged authority on torts generally and
products liability in particular.28 After an eighteen-month study, the task
21. OWEN, supra note 15, § 1.3, at 32.
22. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). The implied
warranty of merchantability requires that goods conform to certain minimum standards: they
must be fit for the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used. Id.
23. Id. § 2-725 (requiring that an action must be commenced within four years after the
cause of action has accrued).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (stating that the rule “applies only
where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated
by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him”).
25. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 7.5, at 487–90 (discussing the consumer expectations
test).
26. See id. at 490–92.
27. Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The Road to Federal Product Liability
Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1363, 1363 (1996).
28. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY:
FINAL REPORT, at ii (1978).
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force issued a report that recommended the drafting of a model productsliability law for use by the states.29 A final version of the model law,
MUPLA, was published by the Department of Commerce in 1979.30
Although it was intended for enactment by the states, it has not been
applied uniformly.
The measures adopted in MUPLA were in many cases quite radical
but were deemed persuasive by most commentators.31 The entire area of
products-liability law was arranged around the central notion of defect until
MUPLA abandoned the consumer expectations test for defect32 and
replaced it with four individual forms of defects: (1) manufacturing or
construction defects, (2) design defects, (3) informational defects, and (4)
express warranties.33 Each of these forms was described in functional
terms. Section 104(A) of MUPLA, dealing with manufacturing or
construction defects, provided that when a dangerous product deviated
from the manufacturer’s self-established standards—for example, the
original design or the normal product—the product was, by definition,
unreasonably unsafe.34 Design defects were addressed in section 104(B),
which stated that a product was defective in design if there was a safer,
feasible alternative design that could have been adopted by the
manufacturer.35 Section 104(C) addressed the failure to warn of nonobvious dangers when the harm could have been prevented or mitigated by
appropriate warnings and instructions.36 Finally, section 104(D) provided
that, where an express warranty was made by the seller relating to the
general safety of the product or the product’s use for a particular purpose,
the seller would be liable if the product did not conform to the express
warranty.37

29. Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 27, at 1366.
30. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (Oct. 31, 1979).
31. See Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2997 (Jan. 12, 1979).
The draft was published in the Federal Register for public comment, and over 1500 pages of
written commentary were received by the Department of Commerce. The overwhelming
majority of public comment was positive. These comments are available on file at the Law
Library of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
32. Aaron D. Twerski & Alvin S. Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product
Liability Law—A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 230 (1979).
33. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721; see also Twerski &
Weinstein, supra note 32, at 224.
34. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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MUPLA has not been enacted in whole by any jurisdiction. However,
many of its provisions have been adopted in state products-liability acts.38
Several measures set out in MUPLA should be considered and codified by
state legislatures.39
Despite MUPLA’s failure to create uniformity among the states, the
products-liability reform movement did not die there. In 1996, the United
States House of Representatives and the Senate each approved legislation
that was aimed at altering the rules of law governing products-liability
actions, damages, and allocations of liability.40 The bill, House Resolution
956,41 was passed by both the House and the Senate by a large majority but
was vetoed by President Clinton.42 This left MUPLA and the Restatement
as the two principal authorities on products-liability law.
B. The Restatement of Torts
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability shares many
features of MUPLA. Like MUPLA, the Restatement ignores the term
“strict liability.”43 It substitutes precise, functional definitions of various
types of defects for the more general consumer expectations test from
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.44 There are, however, a
number of differences between MUPLA and the new Restatement, and
some of these represent the particular view of the authors.45 Others are
probably best explained by the fact that the learned authors, Professors
38. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to -12 (2013).
39. See infra notes 90–141 and accompanying text.
40. Cynthia C. Lebow, Federalism and Federal Product Liability Reform: A Warning
Not Heeded, 64 TENN. L. REV. 665, 667–68 (1997).
41. Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. (1996).
42. See Lebow, supra note 40, at 666.
43. Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability: A Guide
to Its Highlights, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 85, 88 (1998).
44. Id.
45. For example, concerns about the “sellers” exception, where the ultimate sellers are
exempt from liability for the products that they sell, under certain conditions. Henderson’s
and Twerski’s objection to this widely popular measure is that it may leave plaintiffs with
no remedy when the ultimate seller is dismissed from a products-liability action at the early
stages because the manufacturer is available for suit and is solvent. Then, later, at the time
the case reaches trial, the manufacturer is insolvent and the statute of limitations has run
against the retailers and wholesalers who were originally dismissed from the suit. See
JAMES A HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND
PROCESS 74–75 (6th ed. 2008) (proposing an amendment that would toll the statute of
limitations against retailers and wholesalers during the life of the suit against the
manufacturer of the allegedly defective product).
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James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, had to modify their views in order to
have the support of the ALI membership, which included both plaintiff and
defense lawyers. A notable example of one of these compromises is the
provision that plaintiffs need not show a feasible alternative design in all
cases, since the design may be obviously defective and unreasonably
dangerous with no need for an expert opinion.46 Henderson’s own
comment on this is that the possibility of showing a defect without expert
opinion is remote and probably nonexistent.47
III. NORTH CAROLINA PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
A. The Current State of the Law
North Carolina products-liability law is still a work-in-progress.
Serious reform began with the products-liability act, which became
effective on October 1, 1979.48 This legislation has been periodically
revised and updated.49
North Carolina is one of five states that has refused to follow the
strict-liability trend within the context of products liability.50 North
Carolina was fortunate that its innate conservatism prevented it from
joining the strict-liability movement in the 1960s and 1970s and was saved
from several decades of confusion.
Strict liability, precisely defined, means that manufacturers and sellers
are automatically liable for selling defective products that cause harm.51
The plaintiff is not required to show that the defendant was at fault, and due
care on the part of the defendant is not a defense.52 This notion, despite
statements to the contrary, can be found in the implied warranty of

46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (allowing
the plaintiff to infer a defect in situations where common experience shows that an inference
of defect may be warranted under the specific facts).
47. See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1095
(2009).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to -12 (2013).
49. One update came in the form of a provision on ineffective warnings and instructions
that was added in 1995. See Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 522, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1872,
1874–76 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5).
50. OWEN, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 282–83 & n.106. The other four states are
Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Virginia. Id.
51. See Strict Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
52. OWEN, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 266–67.
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merchantability.53 Strict liability, which seemed to be a good thing in the
early sixties, later proved to have a number of serious deficiencies.
First, strict liability does not work well for design and informational
defects. At first, it was thought that a design or informational defect was
still a defect, or something that the ordinary user would refuse, and thus, it
should fall under the strict-liability rule of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.54 It was soon realized, however, that both design and
informational defects inevitably involve negligence, since both refer to a
standard that should have been followed.55 This finding was reconciled
with strict liability in a number of jurisdictions by applying strict liability in
a case and defining it to mean that an alternative, safer, feasible design or
set of warnings was available and was not used or followed.56 This simply
puts a patch on the problem, but the problem still exists.
Second, when strict liability was treated as a separate cause of action
from negligence, the door was opened for juries to find on the same set of
facts that the defendant was not liable in strict liability but was liable under
negligence.57 This is clearly inconsistent, as there can be no fault if the
product is not defective.58 On appeal, the error was sometimes deemed
harmless, and the verdict allowed to stand.59 But in other appeals, the case
was remanded for a new trial with different jury instructions.60 When the
problems already mentioned were not apparent, the very term “strict
liability,” even when correctly explained to the jury, suggests a more severe
kind of liability, and thus, the presence or absence of fault can be viewed as
irrelevant, minimized, or even overlooked.
Finally, and most importantly, the notion of strict liability is not
necessary in modern products-liability litigation. Strict liability only
applies, with any degree of comfort, in manufacturing-defect cases, where
53. See id. § 5.9, at 335–37; see also infra notes 123–130 and accompanying text.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
55. OWEN, supra note 15, § 5.9, at 331. For example, a better design or set of warnings.
56. See, e.g., Boatland of Hous., Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 745–46 (Tex. 1980).
57. See, e.g., Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 973 P.2d 1110, 1116–17 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that, under admiralty jurisdiction, the jury’s finding that the design of the
yacht’s boat door system was not unreasonably dangerous precluded the jury from finding
that the system was negligently designed). This problem is also found when breach of
warranty and strict liability are used for identical fact patterns.
58. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 5.9, at 332–33.
59. See id. at 333 n.34 (noting decisions where various courts found it acceptable for
juries to find liability under one theory but not the other).
60. See Donald P. Blydenburgh, Analyzing Inconsistent Verdicts in Products Liability
Cases: How the Law Promotes Them, Why Juries Render Them, and Why Some Courts
Permit Them, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 46, 47 (2006) (citing Witt v. Norfe, Inc., 725 F.2d 1277,
1278 (11th Cir. 1984)).
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fault is indeed irrelevant.61 Yet, even then, it is unnecessary, since
manufacturing defects can be, and usually are, defined in terms of variation
from the design that carries an unacceptable risk of harm.62 The North
Carolina Products Liability Act expressly states that North Carolina does
not apply strict liability in this context.63 Section 99B-1.1 declares in no
uncertain terms that “[t]here shall be no strict liability in tort in product
liability actions.”64
The current products-liability act is divided into twelve sections, each
covering a specific provision of the act. Definitions pertinent to the act are
set out in section 99B-1.65 This section defines terms used within the
context of the act, such as “claimant,” “manufacturer,” and “seller.”66
The act also provides protections for sellers by imposing an actualfault requirement. This exception, set out in section 99B-2(a), prohibits an
action against a seller who acquires and sells a product in a sealed container
or against one who does not have a reasonable opportunity to inspect.67
This essentially amounts to no liability without fault, and it is now the law
in many jurisdictions.68 This is most clearly stated in judicial opinions,69
but it would be more effective if it was incorporated into the text of section
99B-1 as an exception to the definition of liability.
One of the most significant changes in North Carolina productsliability law came in section 99B-2(b), which effectively eliminated the

61. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 1.3, at 36.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (2013).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 99B-1.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 99B-2(a).
68. Twenty-four states now have some form of legislative protection for nonmanufacturing sellers. See Jim Sinunu & Amy Kott, Commentary, Protection for Retailers:
Developments in Strict Product Liability and Indemnification, WESTLAW J. PROD. LIAB.,
June 2011, at 1, 3. But see Alani Golanski, Paradigm Shifts in Products Liability and
Negligence, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 696 (2010) (“[T]he consensus view in this country has
been that commercial product sellers are subject to privity-free, nondisclaimable strict
liability in tort for physical harm caused by product defects existing at the time of sale.”
(quoting James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and Other
Countries Can Learn from the New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (1999))).
69. See, e.g., McLaurin v. E. Jordan Iron Works, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 2d 590, 601–02
(E.D.N.C. 2009) (holding that products-liability claims of negligence and breach of implied
warranty could not stand because the distributor had no duty pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 99B-2(a) nor any reasonable opportunity to perform diagnostic tests that would have
revealed latent defects).
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privity requirement that existed in prior case law.70 Section 99B-2(b)
provides that the “lack of privity of contract shall not be grounds
for . . . dismissal” in an implied-warranty action against a manufacturer.71
Therefore, a plaintiff may now sue the manufacturer under an impliedwarranty theory without fearing that the privity defense will be raised.
Another significant feature of the products-liability act relates to the
alteration or modification of a product.72 Under section 99B-3(a), if
someone other than the manufacturer or seller alters or modifies the
product, both parties are relieved of liability if (1) the modification or
alteration was not done according to instructions or specifications, or (2)
the alteration or modification was made without the express consent of the
manufacturer or seller.73 Further, the statute broadly defines modification
and alteration, and expressly excludes ordinary wear and tear.74 As a
result, alteration and modification of a product are now affirmative
defenses, and each one, if proven, is an absolute defense.75
Section 99B-4 addresses knowledge or reasonable care on behalf of
the plaintiff.76 If the plaintiff is injured because he disregarded “express
and adequate instructions” of which he knew or should have known, the
manufacturer or seller escapes liability.77 The manufacturer or seller will
not be liable if the plaintiff knew the product was defective and used it in
spite of the danger,78 or if he failed to use reasonable care under the
circumstances.79
The 1995 amendments to the products-liability act were the “first
major alteration[s]” to the statute since its enactment in 1979.80 A section
was added to the act outlining what a claimant must prove to prevail on a
claim involving an inadequate warning or instruction.81 Section 99B-5 sets

70. Charles F. Blanchard & Doug B. Abrams, North Carolina’s New Products Liability
Act: A Critical Analysis, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171, 174 (1980).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2(b).
72. See id. § 99B-3.
73. Id. § 99B-3(a).
74. Id. § 99B-3(b).
75. This is the case as long as North Carolina retains the defense of contributory
negligence. If North Carolina ever abolishes contributory negligence, it will be argued that
a new section should be created for user fault.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4.
77. Id. § 99B-4(1).
78. Id. § 99B-4(2).
79. Id. § 99B-4(3).
80. Matthew William Stevens, Note, Strictly No Strict Liability: The 1995 Amendments
to Chapter 99B, the Products Liability Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2240, 2241 (1996).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5.
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out the elements for an inadequate warning or instruction claim, but it does
little more “than provide a succinct summary of the elements of a
negligence action in products liability.”82
Section 99B-6 was also added in 1995.83 This particular section “lays
out the standard elements for unreasonable design and formulation cases
and provides two alternative ways of proving negligence.”84 The first
alternative is to show that the manufacturer unreasonably failed to
implement a safer alternative design that could have been adopted without
substantially impairing the product.85 The second alternative is to show
that the design was so unreasonable that a reasonable person, aware of the
relevant facts, would not use the product.86
The act also provides protections for public policy purposes. Section
99B-10 provides immunity for donated food.87 This is an important
provision because it allows perfectly good surplus food from stores,
restaurants, churches, and private banquets to be donated for charitable use
without the fear of liability.88 Immunity could be lost, however, if an injury
is caused by the “gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct”
of the donor.89
B. A Proposal for Change
Chapter 99B of the North Carolina General Statutes encompasses a
good deal of modern products-liability law. However, much of the law is
found in judicial opinions, and these rules of law should be incorporated
into the text of the statute. The act also retains some unhelpful residual
provisions from earlier developments;90 modification and explanatory
development of some of these would significantly improve the state of
products-liability law in North Carolina.
Many of the newer provisions that bring the act in line with recent
developments in products-liability law are in the form of judicial opinions.
Although the act includes many of the features set out in reform proposals,
especially adopted measures from MUPLA, more needs to be done. The
recent developments made by the courts should be integrated into the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See Stevens, supra note 80, at 2249.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6.
See Stevens, supra note 80, at 2250.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(a)(1).
Id. § 99B-6(a)(2).
Id. § 99B-10.
Id.
Id.
For example, the user-expectation definition of defect.
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appropriate sections of the act. In short, going forward, North Carolina law
would benefit from further revision of chapter 99B, specifically the
revisions discussed below.
1.

Adopt the Functional Definitions of “Defect”

One issue that needs attention is the way that defects and terms are
defined. Section 99B-1 could be greatly improved by including the
definition of defect in terms of functionality. This could easily be
accomplished by listing and describing the three specific forms of defect:
manufacturing, design, and informational (packaging) defects.91 The
functional definitions of manufacturing or construction, design, and
informational defects, as stated in MUPLA and in the Restatement, are
widely acknowledged both in the courts and by learned commentators.92
The definitions are present in North Carolina’s products-liability act, but
they are scattered throughout.93 A more definite statement would better
serve North Carolina products-liability law.
Defect should be treated as a central notion and should be defined, not
in general terms, but in terms of the basis of liability for each functional
category.94 Products would then be deemed defective if a product (1)
contains a manufacturing defect by virtue of the manufacturer’s variance
from the original design or usual product, (2) is defective in design and it is
shown that a safer, feasible design was available and should have been
adopted by the manufacturer, or (3) is defective because of inadequate
instructions or warnings where there is non-obvious danger or dangers, and
the harm could be avoided or mitigated by feasible warnings and
instructions.95
MUPLA also adds a category of defect where a product is rendered
dangerous by “express warranty” (commonly in promotional materials)
either inducing users to rely on safety promises or encouraging them to
relax their standards for self-care.96 The Restatement omits this provision

91. William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L.
REV. 777, 782 (1983).
92. See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 32, at 225–27, 233–34.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-5, -6.
94. See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 32, at 224 (discussing MUPLA’s
classification of the different bases for liability).
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
96. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (Oct. 31, 1979).
See Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 578 (Ohio 1981) (allowing the
admission of evidence of a car commercial that would have a bearing on the expectations of
an ordinary consumer). This provision is not included in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
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because it sounds more in contract law. But if, as suggested here, the UCC
should no longer be used for tort cases, a further category should be
inserted in section 99B-1 and “express warranty” should be clearly defined
as a category of defect. This schema constitutes a simpler and more
rational way of looking at defective products. It avoids much of the
complexity and confusion inherent in the older statements of remedies.
Chapter 99B does not, as it currently stands, successfully accomplish this
because it has not done more than direct a plaintiff to a commentary
regarding causes of action. For example, if the manufacturer or seller has
failed to respond adequately to a duty or adequately test its product for
safety, it should be clearly stated that an action in negligence is available.
The North Carolina Products Liability Act incorporates these
definitions specifically in sections 99B-5 and 99B-6, but the sections are
rendered unduly complex and somewhat confusing by appending older
notions, such as “unreasonably dangerous.” These older notions might be
deemed harmless if they are intended merely to flesh out the functional
definitions.97
2.

Abolish Separate Forms of Plaintiff Misconduct

Plaintiff misconduct is traditionally divided into a number of forms,
such as misuse, abuse, alteration, and failure to observe routine care.98 The
North Carolina Products Liability Act follows in this general direction.99
These will remain absolute defenses in North Carolina as long as
contributory negligence is the law. These categories are also overtechnical. They are difficult for lawyers to understand and even more
difficult to explain to jurors. Both MUPLA and the Restatement advocate
abolishing these separate notions and bundling all forms of plaintiff
misconduct together in a single percentage amount to be deducted from the
plaintiff’s recovery.100 A number of jurisdictions have followed suit, and
North Carolina should consider taking this approach as well.101
Products Liability. This is quite probably because major manufacturers are adept at puffing
and staying clear of legal warranting.
97. For example, pointing out that the design or warnings or the manufacturer in
question must not only deviate from the suggested models, but the deviation must also be
potentially harmful. It would be better if the intent of these provisions was made plain by
adding a comment distinguishing them from harmless defects.
98. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3.
99. Id.
100. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 cmt. c.
101. See, e.g., Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978); Armstrong
v. Cione, 738 P.2d 79, 82 (Haw. 1987).
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MUPLA suggests the following simple procedure. First, the court will
ask the jury to estimate the total amount of damages.102 Second, the jury
will be directed to decide how much the amount should be reduced for the
total fault attributed to the plaintiff.103
It has been suggested in a number of jurisdictions that this measure
also applies to assumption of the risk.104 In cases where the plaintiff has
expressly or impliedly agreed to hold the defendant harmless (primary
assumption of the risk), the court could assign 100% of the fault to the
plaintiff and no fault to the defendant. In cases of secondary assumption of
the risk, where the defendant was also at fault, the jury could be instructed
to reduce the overall recovery by 25%, 50%, or 75%. This would simplify
the vexing question of user fault considerably.
3.

Replace Contributory Negligence with a Better Option for
Addressing User Fault

Beyond eliminating categories of user misconduct, North Carolina
should consider a new method for determining user fault and liability.
Contributory negligence is the law in North Carolina and in four other
jurisdictions.105 Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, any fault on
the part of the plaintiff completely bars recovery for the plaintiff.106 This
harsh rule prevents a plaintiff with relatively minor fault from recovering
from a far more negligent defendant.107
The majority of states have moved away from the doctrine of
contributory negligence in favor of other doctrines of user fault. Pure
comparative fault was originally established in the California case Li v.
Yellow Cab Co. of California108 and is now used in twelve states.109 Under
pure comparative fault, the plaintiffs lose only that part of the recovery that

102. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734.
103. Id. at 62,734–35.
104. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975).
105. See Eli K. Best & John J. Donohue III, Jury Nullification in Modified Comparative
Negligence Regimes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 945, 950 (2012) (“Contributory negligence is still
used in five jurisdictions: Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia.”) (footnote omitted).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(3) (2013).
107. The doctrine was grounded on the notion of causation, as established in a
nineteenth-century case in which the plaintiff rode a horse recklessly down a narrow street
and caused his own harm. Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927.
108. Li, 532 P.2d at 1232.
109. Best & Donohue, supra note 105, at 949. The states that use pure comparative
negligence are Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington. Id.
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represents their own assigned percentage of fault.110 Thus, a plaintiff who
is attributed 99% of the fault with a recovery of one million dollars will
still receive ten thousand dollars. This has always seemed eminently fair,
but unfortunately, human beings, including jurors, are incapable of
determining such precise percentage degrees of fault.111 In addition, there
is an objection that this system encourages negligent behavior at the
expense of more careful members of society by rewarding plaintiffs with
high degrees of fault.112
Other jurisdictions have implemented the doctrine of modified
comparative fault. The perceived defects in pure comparative fault
schemes have encouraged many states to adopt modified comparative fault.
In twenty-one states, the “fifty percent” rule of comparative negligence is
used.113 Under this system, the “plaintiff[] can recover unless [his]
negligence exceeds that of the defendant.”114 In other words, the plaintiff
will recover as long as his percentage of negligence does not exceed 50%.
In those
Eleven states use the “forty-nine percent” rule.115
jurisdictions, the plaintiff can recover, as long as his percentage of
negligence is less than that of the defendant.116 Unlike pure comparative
fault, the jury is usually informed about the effects of their calculations
before they make their decision.117 This may have the effect of causing a
jury to allocate fault of less than 50% to a sympathetic, badly injured
plaintiff. That risk, however, is better than the alternative, where the
plaintiff receives nothing if he is contributorily negligent.
Finally, user fault is entirely irrelevant in jurisdictions that recognize
strict liability in the context of products liability.118 This extreme notion
was posited on the argument that, because it is not necessary to show that
the defendant was at fault under strict liability, the plaintiff’s fault should

110. Li, 532 P.2d at 1229.
111. See id. at 1231 (discussing the haphazard ways that juries sometimes apportion
fault).
112. See William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1953)
(“It has been said that the rule is intended to discourage accidents, by denying recovery to
those who fail to use proper care for their own safety . . . .”).
113. Best & Donohue, supra note 105, at 949.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 950.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 952.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965). But see
id. § 402A cmt. h (providing that sellers are not responsible for unforeseeable “abnormal
handling”).
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likewise be irrelevant.119 This implausible doctrine has been abandoned by
all but a few jurisdictions.
Because no system of user fault is without flaw, an additional
alternative is suggested. This is based on the concurring opinion of Justice
Clark in Daly v. General Motors Corp.120 Justice Clark contended that it
was ridiculous to ask a jury to decide on a number between zero and 100%
and that the jury should be presented with a uniform index factor such as
30%, 50%, or 70%.121 This suggested alternative is in line with the way
that psychologists approach similar problems, such as the measurement of
pain and other things that extend over a broad spectrum of meanings so that
they are difficult for individuals to describe. In these circumstances, the
decision maker is given a limited number of possibilities (for example, four
or five shades of red to represent the pain he is feeling).
In the measurement of fault, the jury, according to this scheme, would
be presented with only three possibilities: 25%, 50%, and 75%.122 Using
this system, it should be reasonably easy for a jury to agree on a percentage
allocation of fault. The court would then apply the results to the case. If
the jurors fail to reach a consensus, a mean value could easily be reached—
for instance, by striking out the lowest and highest estimates or adopting a
mean value for their findings. This eliminates the need to instruct the jury
regarding the meaning of their decision; the procedure clearly describes
what will happen. This alternative would be simple to explain, reasonably
fair, and it would hopefully avoid the manipulation of the verdict by the
jury in order to bring their findings in line with their sympathies.
4.

Eliminate the UCC from Products-Liability Tort Cases

Products-liability law incorporated several principles from the UCC
that were very useful in its early development. The most important of these
principles was the implied warranty of merchantability.123 This included
the warranty of safety, which was helpful in avoiding contributory
negligence and the difficulty of providing proof of defendant fault.124 But
these problems were addressed in other ways as products-liability law
developed, and the cause of action in warranty is no longer needed.
Furthermore, it shared with strict liability the potential to allow a jury,
when confronted with two more-or-less identical causes of action (warranty
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. § 402A & cmt. n.
Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1175 (Cal. 1978) (Clark, J., concurring).
Id. at 1176.
See id. Some might add a 10% possibility for minimal fault.
OWEN, supra note 15, § 4.3, at 171.
Id. at 171, 176–77.
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and product defect), to reach inconsistent verdicts.125 If the defendant is
held liable under both warranty and product defect, there is no problem.
But if the jury finds no defect in the article and at the same time finds that
there was a breach of warranty, the findings are inconsistent because there
can be no breach of warranty in an article that is not defective. 126
The problem might have been solved if the revised version of Article
2 of the UCC had been approved, allowing the UCC to be used in contract
cases but not in torts. Unfortunately, for other reasons, it was not
approved.127 The only remaining option is for individual states to enact
legislation that restricts the use of the UCC to contracts and eliminates its
use in tort actions. This would be a simpler solution to the problem than
waiting for a new version of Article 2 to be approved.
Eliminating the use of the UCC in tort cases would also solve the
problem of inconsistent statutes of limitation and repose. When a party’s
statute of limitations has run for a cause of action in contracts, the party
may attempt to bring his action in products liability, where either the
triggering event or the time limitation allowed is more favorable.128 The
provisions governing the statute of limitations and repose should be the
same in all products-liability cases.
The distinction between products-liability cases and those sounding in
contract should be clearly stated in North Carolina’s products-liability act.
It is well established that products liability is limited to personal injury and
damage to property other than to the article sold.129 Damage to the article

125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
126. See, e.g., Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 973 P.2d 1110, 1116 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999). A similar problem can occur where strict liability and negligence are both pleaded.
127. See Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 607, 611–12 & nn.15–17 (2001) (providing an insider’s perspective into the
attempted passage of a revised draft of Article 2).
128. See, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 861
(1986). In East River Steamship Corp., the plaintiffs originally brought tort and warranty
claims, but after a statute-of-limitations defense was interposed, several plaintiffs were
dismissed and the complaint was amended to allege only tort claims. Id.
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1(3) (2013) (defining a “[p]roduct liability action” as “any
action brought for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage caused by or
resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formulation, development of
standards, preparation, processing, assembly, testing, listing, certifying, warning,
instructing, marketing, selling, advertising, packaging, or labeling of any product”); see also
E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 871–75 (holding that there was no negligence or productsliability claim where the only injured property was the purchased product itself).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss3/6

18

McQuade and Weeks: Restructure and Reform: Products-Liability Law in North Carolina

2015]

PRODUCTS-LIABILITY RESTRUCTURE AND REFORM

493

sold is a contract matter, which should be brought under UCC
provisions.130
5.

Address Liability for Used Goods

Liability for used goods is not addressed in chapter 99B. The general
principle that fault should be required131 is a good one and might be
deemed to refer to used goods, but the rule needs to be clearly stated. The
general rule is that sellers of used goods are not liable, especially if they
sell the good “as is.”132 Sellers are liable, however, if they fail to notify the
buyer of known defects or if a defect would have been discovered through
reasonable inspection of the goods.133 Some courts have treated expensive,
recently manufactured used cars as being sufficiently new to be covered
under this rule.134 However, the seller in this situation is in no better
position than the buyer to guarantee the safety of the product, especially if
the product is sold “as is.”135 Thus, a used car should not be governed by
the same rules as a new car.
It is recommended that the rules governing used products be
incorporated into chapter 99B. It is also recommended that nearly new,
expensive products be treated as used items. Warranty for parts and labor
is commonly supplied with such items, but the buyer should seek further
warranty. Breach of any additional warranties given by the seller would lie
in contract.
6.

Expand the Learned-Intermediary Rule

The learned-intermediary rule in section 99B-5(c) refers only to the
ordering of prescription drugs by physicians.136 This application is too
narrow, since the learned-intermediary rule is intended to apply to many
persons who might be regarded as reliable mediators of warnings, like
safety officers, factory foremen, or foremen in garages.137 The learned-

130. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 878 (1997)
(describing that the loss of the added superstructures on a defective hull were deemed
property other than the article sold); E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 871–75; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 & cmts. d, e.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4.
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 & cmts. a, k.
133. Id. § 8.
134. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 6.5, at 435.
135. See id.
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5(c).
137. See Keith A. Laughery, Comment, Warnings in the Workplace: Expanding the
Learned Intermediary Rule to Include Employers in the Context of the Product
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intermediary doctrine provides that it is sufficient to deliver a warning to a
responsible person who has a duty to pass on the warning to the ultimate
user.138 However, the exceptions almost swallow the rule. The learnedintermediary rule will not avoid liability if the danger is great, if the learned
intermediary might fail to pass on the warning, and if it is feasible to
directly warn the ultimate user.139 It is clear that the first of these two
exceptions are inevitably present so that the rule reads that the ultimate user
should be warned if it is reasonably feasible to do so.
The learned-intermediary rule is most applicable to doctors who must
adapt any warnings and instructions to the peculiar conditions of their
patients, but there are two exceptions that are recognized. Birth control
pills140 and mass immunization programs141 require adequate warnings and
instructions to be provided to the ultimate user. In both situations,
physician involvement with the patient is considered to be limited so that
there is a duty on the part of the suppliers to directly warn the ultimate
users.
It is recommended that the rule be stated generally not just as it
applies to prescribing physicians. The general exception should state that,
where it is feasible to provide a warning to the ultimate user, a warning
should be provided. In addition, a note might be added to include
illustrative cases—in particular, cases relating to mismatched parts on
assembled truck wheels where mistakes could be alleviated by stamping
the items to be matched on their parts.
CONCLUSION
A revision of the North Carolina Products Liability Act would be the
best method of incorporating additional products-liability provisions into
North Carolina law. While many of the provisions of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability and MUPLA are already incorporated
into North Carolina’s products-liability act or in the case law derived from

Manufacturer/Employer/Employee Relationship, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 627, 632, 635–36
(2005); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i.
138. See Laughery, supra note 137, at 632; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i.
139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i; see also Richard B.
Goetz & Karen R. Growdon, A Defense of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 63 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 421, 428 (2008) (discussing cases in which the manufacturer had a duty to
provide a direct warning to the consumer).
140. Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of LearnedIntermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1, 56–61 (1998).
141. Id. at 50–51.
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the act, both sources should be formally included in chapter 99B. In many
cases, older notions in the existing provisions of chapter 99B should be
removed or clarified to avoid confusion.
From trading contributory negligence for some version of comparative
fault, to expanding the learned-intermediary rule to new contexts, simple
changes to chapter 99B could bring North Carolina’s products-liability law
into the twenty-first century. This could be accomplished with relative
ease with guidance from MUPLA, The Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, and the example of other jurisdictions that have
implemented modern changes.
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